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State secrecy provides an interesting viewpoint on national and supranational judicial
review standards over counterterrorism measures, since it has frequently been invoked by
advanced democracies in the fight against terrorism. Over the last years, the shield of
secrecy has consistently concealed abuses perpetrated during intelligence operations,
including the controversial practice of extraordinary renditions (ERs), carried out around the
world by the US jointly with several European countries. What is more, state secret
privilege has often been claimed during criminal proceedings. Therefore, essential evidence
of serious violations of human rights has been shielded by the privilege, promptly invoked
by governments involved in ERs and in other counterterrorism operations. As a result, such
criminal cases have been dismissed.
From the Italian perspective, the leading case on the matter is the Abu Omar affair. Nasr
Osama Mustafa Hassan (known as Abu Omar), an Egyptian born imam to whom Italy
granted political asylum, was targeted by an ER in Milan, while he was under investigation
due to alleged ties to a terrorist cell. In 2003, he was abducted by CIA and SISMI (the then
Italian military intelligence agency) agents and rendered to his homeland, where he was
subjected to incommunicado detention and tortured.
Following a complex investigation led by the Public Prosecutor of Milan, in 2009 the
Tribunal of Milan convicted, in absentia, twenty-two CIA officers and one US Air Force
colonel for Abu Omar’s kidnapping, but acquitted three US citizens because of diplomatic
immunity. More importantly, it was forced to dismiss all charges against five Italian agents
involved in the operation, as they invoked the state secret privilege, promptly confirmed by
the head of the Italian government, i.e. the President of the Council of Ministers (PCM).
According to Italian law, specifically Article 1 Law 124/2007, only the PCM is vested with
the power to resort to the state secret privilege. Therefore, when, during a criminal trial,
defendants (in the case at hand, Italian SISMI officers) claim state secrecy on evidence,
the judicial authority has to ask the PCM whether such information has been effectively
classified as state secret (see Article 202 Code of Criminal Procedure). Neither public
prosecutors nor judges can use, directly or indirectly, information and material covered by
the privilege. As a result, if such evidence is of crucial importance, the case will be
dismissed. However, when judicial authorities disagree with the PCM on the secrecy issue,
the Constitutional Court is called to solve the dispute between executive and judicial power
(so-called conflict of allocation of powers, see Article 134 Italian Constitution).
In the Abu Omar case, the use of state secrecy led to seven conflicts of allocation of
powers, decided by the Constitutional Court always in favor of the Italian executive (i.e. of
the PCM). In particular, the Constitutional Court’s decision 106/2009, settling the dispute
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between judicial authorities and the PCM in favor of the latter, forced the Tribunal of Milan
to dismiss the case and acquit Italian intelligence officers, as mentioned above. In the
meantime, both the Public Prosecutor and convicted defendants challenged the decision of
the Tribunal of Milan before the Court of Appeal of Milan, which upheld all convictions.
However, due to the Constitutional Court’s decision 106/2009, Italian SISMI agents were
again acquitted and their case dismissed. Hence, a ‘curtain of secrecy’ was dropped on the
events. On this specific point, the General Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal challenged the
second instance court’s decision before the Supreme Court of Cassation (i.e. the Italian
highest court). The Court of Cassation confirmed convictions of all US agents. However,
following an interpretation of state secrecy different from (and stricter than) the one given
by the Constitutional Court, it struck down the SISMI agents’ acquittal and referred the case
back to the Court of Appeal. This time, due to a different standard of scrutiny on secrecy
(recommended by the Court of Cassation), the Court of Appeal reviewed all pieces of
evidence, so SISMI agents were convicted for the imam’s kidnapping. Yet, while this
proceeding was pending, the Constitutional Court was called to solve a further dispute
between the PCM and the Court of Cassation on the use of state secrecy. The
Constitutional Court’s decision 24/2014 adhered to the reasoning of judgment 106/2009
and settled the dispute in favor of the PCM, considering the state secret privilege lawfully
invoked. As a consequence, the Court of Cassation was forced to acquit Italian SISMI
agents and dismiss the case.
However, the case was still not over as Abu Omar and his wife lodged a complaint at the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) claiming breaches of Articles 3 (prohibiting
torture and inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment), 5 (safeguarding liberty and security),
8 (protecting private and family life) and 13 (ensuring an effective remedy) of the European
Convention. In 2016 the ECtHR condemned Italy for all the above-mentioned violations and
settled its case law on the ERs program (the landmark precedent being the El-Masri
judgment, whose findings were reiterated in Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah). On the thorny
issue of state secrecy the Court of Strasbourg shared the stance of the Italian Court of
Cassation and criticized the Constitutional Court’s self-restraint.
A comparison between the Constitutional Court’s and the Court of Cassation’s reasoning
highlights two different standards of scrutiny on secrecy and very divergent approaches on
several key points.
First of all, they disagreed on the object of the state secret itself. The Constitutional Court
stated that only relations between Italian and US security services had been shielded by
the privilege. Therefore, since state secrecy had not been invoked on Abu Omar’s rendition
(i.e. a serious crime), it was used lawfully. Yet, the strong link between SISMI-CIA mutual
relations and events related to Abu Omar’s rendition prevented the Court of Cassation from
endorsing the Constitutional Court’s stance. According to the Court of Cassation, state
secret privilege cannot be lawfully asserted on gross violations of human rights as ERs are.
Since both the Italian government and the head of SISMI denied their participation in Abu
Omar’s ER, such a serious crime was perpetrated by single SISMI agents, who acted on
their own initiative and outside of their official duties. Consequently, according to the Court
of Cassation, state secrecy had not been invoked lawfully; thus, the case had to be heard
again by the Court of Appeal using all pieces of evidence, including those initially classified.
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Another controversial issue concerns the state secret assertion’s timing. SISMI agents
invoked the privilege when the trial was already ongoing, rather than during investigations.
Moreover, the state secret was claimed on information already in the public domain, due to
the inquiries of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (see Fava Report and
Marty Reports I and II). According to the Constitutional Court, a belated assertion of
secrecy should not be disregarded by ordinary courts, irrespective of public knowledge on
facts and information. Therefore, although critical evidence was obtained before the
secrecy’s assertion, the late invocation of state secret would prevent ordinary courts from
using such pieces of evidence. Differently, the Court of Cassation maintained that the
lawfulness of the privilege depends on whether classified evidence was obtained lawfully.
And, in no way, the privilege can be invoked to shield facts and information already in the
public domain (in accordance with the ECtHR and differently from US courts’ stance in the
El-Masri case). Particularly, the Court of Cassation denied that the assertion of state secret
on facts already known could grant impunity to perpetrators. Therefore, in that case, state
secrecy is unlawful and the privilege cannot be lawfully invoked to conceal evidence in a
criminal proceeding.
Lastly, the two Italian courts disagreed on the interpretation of limits established by Article
39, section 11, Law 124/2007 on the resort to secrecy. In particular, pursuant to section 11,
the privilege cannot be used to hide acts ‘against the constitutional order’. The
Constitutional Court provided a narrow interpretation of ‘constitutional order’ and stated that
Abu Omar’s ER is not an act of subversion of the constitutional system. As a result, in Abu
Omar’s case, the limit set by section 11 is not applicable. However, in its reasoning, the
Court arguably conflated two different concepts: ‘constitutional order’ and ‘constitutional
system’. Instead, these two slightly different wordings bear substantive difference.
‘Constitutional system’ is referred to as a form of government (and the organization and
functioning of constitutional institutions), while ‘constitutional order’ (as the Court of
Cassation clarified) also encompasses general principles and fundamental values,
including human rights, at the core of the Italian constitutional framework. Briefly, the latter
encloses the former. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court read ‘constitutional order’ as
‘constitutional system’. As a consequence, the limit of the use of state secrecy was not
triggered, because ERs are not aimed to overthrowing the Italian government. In my view,
since Abu Omar’s ER is a serious crime, it jeopardizes the Italian constitutional order, so
state secret privilege should not have been used, nor its assertion held lawful by the
Constitutional Court.
In sum, Italian courts’ reasoning shared the same basic assumption: the state secret is
tightly linked to the salus rei pubblicae, which includes independence, international
personality, territorial integrity and, ultimately, survival of the state. Therefore, as an
exception to the general rule of transparency, on which democracy lies, and in order to
protect the above-mentioned fundamental values, the head of government (i.e. the PCM) is
vested with the power to resort to state secret. Both courts underlined the very political
nature of such prerogative. However, according to Article 39, section 11, Law 124/2007:
‘[i]n no circumstances shall information, documents or matters relating to acts of terrorism,
acts subverting the constitutional order or acts constituting […] criminal offences […] have a
[s]tate secret-status’. In other words, the seal of secrecy shall not be used to conceal
crimes, abuses and wrongdoings by intelligence agents. In order to check the resort to
3/4
secrecy and avoid its misuse, the Italian system provides two kinds of oversight. A political
oversight by the Parliament, triggered only if a parliamentary committee specialized on
intelligence activities deems the assertion of secrecy unlawful. Such oversight is quite
weak, since it is not empowered to change the (possibly wrong) PCM’s decision on
secrecy. Indeed, Abu Omar’s case has not been reviewed by the Parliament. The other
oversight is judicial. However, since the ordinary judges are not allowed to scrutinize state
secrets, the only effective review should be performed by the Constitutional Court. For that
reason, the fact that the Italian Constitutional Court abdicated its role is particularly
disturbing. In Abu Omar’s case, the Constitutional Court took an excessive deferential
approach towards the executive branch, albeit the ER was a gross violation of basic human
rights. Instead of scrutinizing the state secret’s lawfulness, the Constitutional Court
emphasized the wide discretionary power of the PCM to turn the secrecy issue into a
merely political question, so de facto avoiding its duty to assess the secrecy’s lawfulness.
This deferential attitude skewed the balance between human rights and national security in
favor the latter.
Hopefully, the firm stance embraced by the against secrecy and in favor of transparency
and accountability will lead the Italian Constitutional Court to change its excessively
deferential approach.
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